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Interest groups play a crucial role in public policymaking. Providing information is 
often asserted to be the primary way to influence decision-makers. Although decision-
makers recognize that interest groups do have specialized private information and high 
technical expertise, they are aware that there may be an incentive for such groups to 
attempt to bias their decisions by manipulating the information transmitted in their favor. 
In this sense, a concern arises about the negative impact such groups may have on the 
quality of democratic government or economic indicators. 
In the opposite direction, this research is concerned with the extent to which private 
interest groups can consider the preferences of other agents when lobbying. With this 
purpose in mind, we develop a game-theoretical lobbying model in which two interest 
groups with different utility functions must interact with a decision-maker in order to 
influence its decision. On the one hand, the groups are assumed to have private 
information that is relevant to the decision-maker, whilst, on the other hand, the decision-
maker is aware of the strategic incentives the groups have to report biased information. 
This situation is analysed by considering two scenarios: a proactive scenario, in which 
the interest groups act before the decision-maker reveals its utility function, and a reactive 
scenario, in which the groups’ actions comes after the decision-maker reveals its utility 
function. 
We show that in a setting of partially conflicting interests, there exists a rationale for 
a group to consider the preferences of other agents, even if it is to improve its own utility. 
Furthermore, the model reveals some interesting findings: interest groups lobby decision-
makers with similar utility functions; lobbying messages may be informative even if there 
is a partial conflict of interest; and groups do establish credibility with the decision-maker. 
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Grupos de interesse desempenham um papel fundamental na formulação de políticas 
públicas. O fornecimento de informações costuma ser considerado o principal meio de 
influenciar os decisores.  Embora os decisores reconheçam que os grupos de interesse 
possuem informações privadas especializadas e grande conhecimento técnico, eles sabem 
que existe um grande incentivo para que tais grupos tentem influenciar as suas decisões 
através da manipulação da informação que é transmitida. Nesse sentido, surge uma 
preocupação com o impacto negativo que os grupos de interesse podem ter na qualidade 
do governo democrático ou de indicadores econômicos. 
No sentido oposto, esta pesquisa preocupa-se com a importância que os grupos de 
interesse privado podem atribuir às preferências de outros agentes nas suas ações de 
lobbying. Com este propósito, desenvolveu-se um modelo baseado na teoria dos jogos no 
qual dois grupos de interesse com diferentes funções de utilidade devem interagir com 
um decisor a fim de influenciar a sua decisão. Por um lado, assume-se que os grupos 
possuem informação privada que é relevante para o decisor, enquanto que, por outro, o 
decisor está ciente dos incentivos que os grupos possuem para reportar informações 
enviesadas. Esta situação é analisada através de dois cenários: o proativo, no qual os 
grupos de interesse agem antes que o decisor revele sua função de utilidade, e o reativo, 
no qual a ação dos grupos ocorre depois do decisor revelar a sua função de utilidade. 
Demonstra-se que, numa situação de interesses parcialmente conflituosos, existe uma 
racionalidade para que um grupo considere as preferências de um outro agente, ainda que 
isso seja com o propósito de melhorar a sua própria utilidade. Além disso, o modelo revela 
outros resultados interessantes: os grupos de interesse fazem lobbying com decisores que 
possuem funções de utilidade similares; as mensagens de lobbying podem ser 
informativas ainda que haja um conflito parcial de interesses; e grupos de interesse agem 
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COMPETITIVE LOBBYING: THE MATTER OF NON-EGOISTIC BEHAVIOR IN 
REPEATED GAMES 
By Vanessa Santos Mello 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Providing information to regulators, policymakers, or legislators is often asserted to 
be the primary way to influence decision-makers. The ability of an interest group to 
provide relevant data in support of its position is an essential advantage in the run for 
influence. On the other hand, although decision-makers recognize that interest groups 
have specialized private information and high technical expertise, they are aware that 
there is an incentive for such groups to attempt to bias their decisions by manipulating 
the information transmitted in their favor.  
It is a fact that interest groups play a crucial role in public policymaking. Sometimes 
they are faced as intermediaries between society and the government. More often, 
however, a concern arises about the negative impact such groups may have on the quality 
of democratic government or economic indicators. Undoubtedly, this concern refers to 
private interest groups, defined by Pereira (2008) as those in which the welfare of their 
members is improved at the expense of non-members. This definition is based on the 
assumption that all the actions of such groups are guided by egoistic behavior. 
The concept of rationality in neoclassical economics is based on utility maximization, 
assuming that an economic agent decides to maximize his or her utility, and thus behaves 
in a purely selfish way. Rational choice is an adequate description of behavior in many 
real-life situations. However, there are several other situations where behavior reveals 
that individuals are not entirely selfish, but have social preferences, exhibit empathy, and 
are altruistic, as observed in the donation of resources or volunteer work, for example. 
This dissertation aims to provide an answer to the following question: is there a 
rationale for a private interest group to consider the preferences of other players in a world 
of self-interested agents?  
For this research, we develop a simple model of two interest groups lobbying based 
on the central premise that such activity is an exercise of strategic information 
VANESSA S. MELLO  COMPETITIVE LOBBYING: THE MATTER OF NON-
EGOISTIC BEHAVIOR IN REPEATED GAMES 
7 
 
transmission. We assume that the groups possess information the decision-maker does 
not, and, at some point, such information is essential for the decision-maker in what the 
consequences of taking one action rather than another are concerned. However, given that 
the interests of the decision-maker do not necessarily coincide with those of the interest 
groups, the extent to which a group can persuade a decision-maker to act in its interest is 
questionable. 
The present research demonstrates that, while interest groups seek to improve the 
welfare of their members, their actions are not motivated solely by selfishness and often 
incorporate benevolent aspects. Thus, the goal would be to increase the welfare of their 
members without necessarily implying a reduction in the welfare of non-members, which 
could remain constant or even increase. In other words, the action of the group could lead 
to improvements according to the Pareto criterion1. 
This behavior would be justified by increasing the influence power of the group over 
government, which would see it as an essential ally in strategic decision-making. In 
contrast, the interest group would see its chance of success grow and, even if its gains are 
lower than it is possible or desirable, it would have improved its initial position by 
increasing the welfare of its members. 
Some observations regarding the action of interest groups in Brazil were the primary 
motivation for this research. The Brazilian oil and gas sectors are subject to sectoral 
regulation, and ever since the sectors were opened to the private initiative, different 
interest groups appeared, representing all interested parties of this activity. My 
observations are related to the action of one specific group that, on many occasions, has 
decided to defend a position that was not necessarily the best for its interests. This 
situation happens for many reasons. The importance that the group attributes to credibility 
is one of them. Considering that the interaction with the decision-maker is a continuous 
process, we have a situation of repeated interaction, which means that the group may seek 
to acquire a reputation for being benevolent or presenting trustable information early in 
the game. This behavior is relevant because the extent to which any information offered 
to alter or to influence beliefs is effective depends on the credibility of the lobbyist to the 
decision-maker in question. 
 
1 See Varian (2017). 
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Secondly, assuming the government´s utility function is related to the political support 
it receives (its objective is to be reelected), the occurrence of previous discussions among 
organized groups of the sectors before sending a message to the decision-maker is 
common. The aim is to guarantee the maximum support to an idea in order to influence 
the decision-maker’s beliefs more effectively. The rationale behind this strategy is easy 
to understand: if the government wants to assure political support from all groups, an idea 
defended by all the groups is more easily implemented than an idea advocated by only 
one group. Logically, if groups with partially different interests send the same message, 
at least one of them had to forgo its best choice. 
Finally, an interesting behavior that we could observe is the commitment regarding 
the objectives defined by the decision-maker. Given that, every time the government 
signalizes a goal and requests information, the group makes the best of its efforts to attend 
the decision-maker’s demand making sure the government will achieve its objective and 
its members will also receive an improvement on its welfare. 
The plan for this dissertation is as follows. In Section 2, we relate this research to the 
literature - while the primary motivations for this study stem from the theory of regulation, 
it is relevant to approach the topic by considering the signaling literature. Section 3 
presents the basic concepts for the construction of the model. In Section 4, we develop 
the basis of the model, while in Sections 5 and 6 we analyze two different scenarios: 
proactive lobbying and reactive lobbying, respectively. In Section 7, we conclude. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. The Theory of Economic Regulation 
The literature known as the theory of economic regulation had its beginning in Sigler 
(1971), and its principal characteristic is described as below: 
The most important element of this theory is its integration of the analysis of political 
behavior with the larger body of economic analysis. Politicians, like the rest of us, are 
presumed to be self-interested maximizers. This means that interest groups can influence the 
outcome of the regulatory process by providing financial or other support to politicians or 
regulators. 
In: Peltzman (1989), p. 1. 
Some relevant versions of capture theory had appeared earlier than Stigler's seminal 
paper2. For this reason, his model could be interpreted as a refined version of capture 
theory, considering that he introduced an original aspect by accumulating evidence from 
empirical research within the discipline. It is unclear, however, whether the theory of 
economic regulation is a theory about interest groups lobbying in the regulatory process 
or it is a theory focused on demonstrating that regulation is intended to protect the 
regulated industry. 
Stigler’s model is shaped by two costs of obtaining legislation: information and 
organization. Stigler (1971, p.3) states that “regulation is acquired by the industry and is 
designed and operated primarily for its benefit”. Groups with lower costs tend to be 
favored at the expense of groups with higher costs. Numerically large groups tend to be 
the losers in the regulatory process. The main conclusion is that producers’ interests will 
always be victorious in the dispute over the services of a regulatory agency. More 
generically, in any similar political dispute between groups of different sizes, the more 
compactly organized interests will usually win. The conclusion stems directly from Olson 
(2009). 
Additionally, Stigler (1971) specifies the objects of choice in the utility function of 
politicians in two aspects – votes and resources. The industry that seeks regulation must 
be prepared to pay with these two things. 
 
2 See Bentley (1908) and Truman (1951). 
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The emphasis on political behavior, aimed at satisfying self-interest, and the costs of 
information and organization have become the touchstone of subsequent literature in 
regulation theory. 
Posner (1974) argues that Stigler’s theory is unsatisfactory and cannot be said to have 
substantial empirical support. He defends that regulation may be the product of coalitions 
between the regulated industry and customer groups, at the expense of unorganized 
groups. 
Peltzman (1976) further elaborated on the analysis of the action of interest groups. 
The author defends that no economic interest captures the regulator in an exclusive way 
and that regulation is a process of wealth transfer. The main reason is that the regulator 
will seek a structure of costs and benefits that maximizes its political return. In other 
words, the regulator’s choice problem is not limited to selecting the appropriate size of 
an interest group to benefit; it includes the selection of a proper structure of benefits and 
costs able to guarantee political support from all groups. For this reason, even if a single 
economic interest gets all the benefits of regulation, these must be less than the maximum 
result the group could obtain. He concludes that regulation usually tries to conciliate the 
interests of producers and consumers. The conclusion goes on the opposite direction of 
Stigler’s idea that regulation exclusively protects the producers. 
It is interesting to note that Peltzman (1976) indicates the possibility of a capture made 
by the regulator – a typical agency problem in which the decision-maker (principal) 
imposes its objective function over the agents. Stigler (1971) did not consider this aspect 
in his analysis. 
Both Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976), however, ignore the fact that regulators are 
usually agents of an executive or legislature rather than agents seeking votes. They also 
disregard situations in which decision-makers need specialized private information in 
order to understand possible outcomes of their decisions. If that is the case, the decision-
maker will be in the position of demander and may interact with interest groups to collect 
information. 
Becker (1983) has a setup similar to Peltzman’s: groups organize to exert pressure on 
the political process to obtain benefits. He assumes the capacity of a group to exert 
pressure is a function of the number of members and the resources spent by member for 
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maintaining the lobbying activity: pressure increases when expenditures increase. Even 
though popular support (voters) is said to be a relevant element in exerting pressure, the 
aspect was not incorporated in the function. Moreover, the author does not define what 
he means by “exerting political pressure”, albeit he highlighted the relevance of the 
productivity of the groups’ expenditures for this purpose. Therefore, there is some 
implicit evidence in the paper that indicates the distribution of relevant information for 
the decision-maker as a way of raising the influence of a group. The model does not 
examine aspects regarding the relevance of groups’ credibility in increasing their 
influence. 
In accordance with Becker’s research, competition among groups can lead to efficient 
results, although cooperation is necessary to prevent the wasteful expenditures on 
political pressure that result from the competition for influence. In contrast, the author 
presents the political model as a zero-sum in influence – the increased influence of some 
groups decreases the influence of others by equal amounts – and, given that, cooperation 
is difficult to achieve. 
The theory of economic regulation has two relevant limitations: it ignores both the 
principal-agent problem and the existence of information asymmetry (Laffont & Tirole; 
1993). Considering the absence of such asymmetries, regulated firms would be incapable 
of extracting rent and, therefore, would have no incentive to lobby. Similarly, voters and 
legislators would be able to control their agents (politicians and agencies) that, hence, 
would not act in benefit of interest groups. 
The school focuses on the “demand side,” which implies a naive assumption that 
decision-makers’ role in the political scenario is mainly to transmit the pressure of interest 
groups. It also disregards the differences between the objective functions of decision-
makers and interest groups, ignoring that, under a context of information asymmetry, the 
rational and opportunistic behavior is present in all players. 
2.Erro! Autoreferência de indicador não válida.2. Strategic Transmission of Private 
Information 
We should care about information transmission for two reasons. Decision-makers are 
usually choosing policies without complete information. For this reason, information 
becomes valuable and those who possess it are in the position to influence policies in their 
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favor. On the other hand, when agents’ payoffs depend both on the better-informed 
agent’s information and on the decision of the decision-maker, the latter is aware that the 
first has an incentive to attempt to bias its decision by manipulating the information 
transmitted. 
In a seminal paper, Crawford and Sobel (1982) study the strategic information 
transmission in the context of an abstract sender-receiver game. There are two agents, one 
of whom has private information relevant for both. The Sender (S), the better-informed 
one, sends a signal based on his private information to the other agent, the Receiver (R). 
R then makes a decision that defines the payoff of both players, based on the information 
contained in the signal. Given that, S will include enough information in the signal to 
induce R to respond to it and will hold back enough so that his response is as favorable 
as possible. Variants of this model have been applied widely ever since. 
Direct communication is more likely to play an important role the more closely related 
are agents’ preferences (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Potters and Van Winden, 1992; 
Austen-Smith, 1993). In the opposite direction, under a situation of conflicting 
preferences, Crawford and Sobel (1982) indicate that only no communication is 
consistent with rational behavior, and, for this reason, their model disregards issues 
related to reputation and credibility. 
The most natural way to incorporate those aspects is to model the interaction as a 
repeated game. Sobel (1985) defines that credibility can only be communicated through 
actions and that an agent could become credible by providing accurate and relevant 
information or by acting responsibly. The model establishes that S and R will play the 
game a finite number of times and, at each stage: (a) R decides its action by accessing the 
credibility of S; and, (b) S can enhance its reputation by providing honest information to 
R. Sobel considers that, at some point, a group with opposed preferences to the decision-
maker will take advantage by misleading him. When this happens, S loses all 
opportunities for deception in the future given that his reputation falls, and R believes 
nothing that he says. Aspects related to credibility were also considered by Kreps and 
Wilson (1982) and by Austen-Smith (1993). 
Kreps and Wilson (1982) have studied the power of reputation on finitely repeated 
games. The model allows us to assert that reputation matters both in the context of 
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infinitely repeated games and on finite games with some uncertainty (incomplete 
information) as to the payoffs of each player. This paper and the research of Milgrom and 
Roberts (1982) were the first to present models in which players exploit uncertainty and 
take short-term losses seeking to build a reputation and make long-term gains. 
Austen-Smith (1993) indicates that the extent to which any information offered to 
alter the beliefs of a decision-maker is effective depends on the credibility of the group. 
In his model, credibility is considered as an endogenous variable and depends on how 
closely the preferences of the interest group and the decision-maker are, and on how 
confident is the decision-maker that the group is informed. The author does not consider, 
however, that both agents interact through time, developing reputations. 
Sobel (1985) defends that repeated plays allow the decision-maker to evaluate better 
the usefulness of a group’s information (R prefers to deal with a single Sender for t 
periods rather than t Senders separately). Long-term arrangements are a useful tool to 
moderate the inefficiencies caused by incomplete information. In the same direction, 
Potter and Van Winden (1992) indicate that repeated communication is more costly to 
the interest group and that higher costs induce a more favorable response from the 
decision-maker because private information is signaled more persuasively. 
Potters and Van Winden (1992) indicate that lobbying messages from an interest 
group to a decision-maker may be informative even if there is a substantial conflict of 
interest. In that sense, there is scope for informational lobbying if there is sufficient 
congruence in the agent’s preferences. 
Sobel (1985) and Potters and Van Winden (1992) assume the possibility of a no-
transmission equilibrium, in which R takes the same action regardless of S’s signal. In 
other words, R’s response to lobbying is more favorable to S if R would already have 
made this favorable decision based on its prior beliefs. 
Lobbying messages are more likely to occur if the interest group has ‘good’ 
information (informational signal) and if the costs of a message are small relative to the 
potential benefits. A rationale for costly lobbying exists if it induces a favorable change 
in the decision maker’s behavior relative to its prior beliefs and if S believes that R 
expects to receive any information and will make a less favorable decision in case of 
silence (Potter and Van Winden; 1992). In what concerns this aspect, Austen-Smith 
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(1993) indicates that not lobbying can itself constitute an informative signal (if R is 
indifferent between the status quo and a new proposal, in the absence of any influential 
lobbying, R will choose the new proposal). This means there is always an informed 
interest group that decide not to send a signal. 
2.3. Critical analysis and interpretation 
By analyzing the literature, it is noted that interest groups typically use an influence 
function to represent the transformation of inputs (money, capital, and labor) into political 
influence (e.g., Becker, 1985; Tullock, 1980). However, a major criticism of such models 
is that the interaction underlying its transformation is lacking (Mitchell, 1990). 
In fact, the orthodox view of the lobbying activity is that such expenditures help to 
reinforce or to shape decision-maker’s positions (Matthews, 1960; Milbrath, 1960; Bauer, 
Poll and Dexter, 1963; Zeigler, 1964; Scott and Hunt, 1966; Dexter, 1969). Schlozman 
and Tierney (1986), Salisbury, Heinz, Laumann and Nelson (1987) and Berry (1989) state 
that the vast amount of money they spend on lobbying suggests that the interest groups’ 
influence may be considerable. Actually, recent empirical studies have demonstrated that 
lobbying can yield significant dividends in political support (Smith, 1984; Fowler and 
Shaiko, 1987; Smith, 1988; Rothenberg, 1989; Smith, 1989; Wright, 1990). 
In contrast with the theory of economic regulation, under the information transmission 
approach, the political agents are treated as players and one aspect of the interaction is 
explicitly modeled as information transmission. This comes at the cost of not 
incorporating any competition between interest groups. On the other hand, the theory of 
economic regulation does not consider issues regarding the credibility and reputation of 
interest groups. 
For the purpose of this research, lobbying will be modeled as a game of strategic 
information transmission. It will be necessary, however, to consider the possibility of 
competition and cooperation between interest groups. This is relevant because there are 
situations that information provided by one interest group can be contradicted or affirmed 
by messages from another group. Additionally, we have substantial support in the theory 
of economic regulation to consider that under a scenario of competition between interest 
groups, each one will seek to raise its political influence through the support of other 
groups or interested parties. 
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Given the exposed so far, the model that will be developed in this research differs 
from principal-agent models (e.g., Grossman and Hart; 1983) since it is not assumed that 
the uninformed player (R) can commit itself to a message-response profile at the 
beginning of the game. It also differs from cheap talk games (e.g., Farrell and Rabin; 
1996), in that it is not assumed that informational lobbying is costless (Austen-Smith; 
1994). It will be assumed that there is no way for R to check the accuracy of S’s message 
and players will be allowed to have different interests (contrary to, e.g., Crawford and 
Sobel, 1982). Also, we do not assume that lying is impossible (Milgrom, 1981). The 
model also differs from persuasion games (e.g., Bartlett, 1973; Calvert, 1985; Milgrom 
and Roberts;1986) since in these games the decision-maker and the interested parties 
interact only once so that issues regarding credibility and reputation does not arise. 
Furthermore, as Potter and Van Winden (1992), we assume that the cost of a signal is 
fixed, which means that it is independent of the content of the message and the private 
information of the sender. This assumption differs from a wide class of signaling games 
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3. BASIC CONCEPTS 
That are two types of information that are germane to the lobbying context: the first 
one is technical, while the second one concerns intentions (Austen-Smith; 1992). 
Technical information is related to the information the decision-maker lacks regarding 
the consequences of choosing one action or another. On the other hand, verbal 
commitments and threats, or the coordination of actions, are examples of the second type 
of information (Banks and Calvert; 1990). This research focuses on technical information. 
Additionally, we are not concerned about the form of the message transmitted to the 
decision-maker. It is the informational content of the message that matters. 
It should be clear from the exposed so far that lobbying is presumed to be strategic: 
an interest group chooses its political messages in an attempt to convince decision-makers 
to take one action rather than another. Logically, it is also expected that rational listeners 
are aware of the strategic nature of such messages. 
We must also define a further restriction on our focus of attention. Potters and Van 
Winden (1992) consider that three incentive structures should be distinguished. In the 
first structure, there is no conflict of interest between the decision-maker and an interest 
group regarding the best action the decision-maker can take: the interest group has no 
incentive to provide bad information and there is no reason for the decision-maker to 
mistrust a message from this group. Hence, we say that this interest group is a Friend (F) 
of the decision-maker and has no incentive to lie or make an untruthful report on its 
private information given the congruence of interests between both agents. In the second 
structure, there is full conflict of interests between the decision-maker and an interest 
group. In this case, the group has an incentive to be dishonest and to misinform the 
policymaker, who will always interpret a message unfavorably for the group. No message 
will be sent under this scenario. Thirdly, there is a case of partial conflict of interests 
regarding the best action the decision-maker can take. We say that the interest group is 
an Enemy (E) of the decision-maker and may have incentives to lie or to make an 
untruthful report on its private information to influence its decision. The problem of the 
scope for information transmission is clearly most pertinent in this case.  
It also is relevant to refer that, for the present research, we follow the model 
constructed by Austen-Smith (1994). The author states that assuming the existence of 
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organized groups on both sides of an issue, only the group whose interests the legislator 
will vote against in the absence of lobbying activity has incentives to devote resources to 
lobbying. The group whose interests the legislator is inclined to vote for ex-ante has no 
incentive to lobby if no other group does. However, if the group against the legislator 
decides to lobby, the second group must act in counteractive lobbying, that is, in providing 
information to offset any influence the initial group might exert. 
Therefore, we will assume the existence of two interest groups competing for 
influence: one group has no conflict of interests with the decision-maker, F; and another 
group with partial conflict of interest with the decision-maker, E. We also consider two 
different approaches. An interest group may acquire information prior to, and 
independently of, the introduction of a legislative agenda; or it may acquire information 
only after the legislative agenda is revealed (Austen-Smith and Wright; 1992). In other 
words, a group may act proactively or reactively. 
As such, an interest group acts in a proactive way if it decides to influence the 
decision-maker before it reveals its utility function. Consider a situation in which the 
decision-maker is satisfied with the current scenario but an interest group decides to 
persuade it into leaving the status quo by sending a lobbying message. It is logical to 
assume that this group believes it could improve its welfare in case the decision-maker 
takes action to leave the status quo. After this, an opponent group sends a lobbying 
message to reinforce or to counteract the rival. The lobbying messages are an attempt to 
inform or to misinform the decision-maker, but this decision-maker only discovers if the 
groups lied and whether they are an “enemy” or a “friend” after making the decision 
regarding the messages received. 
In this case, we assume that in the absence of a lobbying message, the decision-maker 
prefers to take no action. This reflects the beliefs of the decision-maker regarding the 
preferences of its voters: if the status quo is maintained, the decision-maker believes it 
will not lose any political support from its voters (prior belief); however, depending on 
the lobbying messages received, the decision-maker may be willing to reevaluate its 
position. 
The decision-maker wants to guarantee political support from all interest groups 
(Peltzman; 1976) and, therefore, the only way to persuade it into changing the status quo 
VANESSA S. MELLO  COMPETITIVE LOBBYING: THE MATTER OF NON-
EGOISTIC BEHAVIOR IN REPEATED GAMES 
18 
 
is through the existence of consensus between the messages of both groups regarding the 
best action the decision-maker could take. We assume that the decision-maker believes it 
can increase its political support by taking an action that improves the welfare of both 
interest groups (potential voters) without losing anyone’s support. Therefore, even though 
the decision-maker is not sure about the real motives behind a lobbying message from an 
interest group, if both groups transmit the same message, we assume the decision-maker 
prefers to believe in the messages in order to assure political support. 
We model proactive lobbying as a sequential game. Only one interest group can start 
the process by sending a lobbying message, while the other group acts in the sequence. 
Considering that we have two rival groups competing for influence, we assume that one 
of them is F, while the other is E. Logically, F is more satisfied with the status quo than 
E, given that F’s utility function is similar to the decision-maker’s, who has no intention 
to take action to leave the status quo if no lobbying message is transmitted. For that 
reason, we expect that E will start the sequential game by sending the first lobbying 
message. 
Assuming the existence of a second interaction between the interest groups and the 
decision-maker, its decision rule only remains unchanged if E tells the truth in the first 
stage of the game. If the decision-maker concludes that E had incentives to report biased 
information and chose not to, E gains reputation that assures the decision-maker will 
listen to its message in the second stage of the game. On the other hand, when E lies, it is 
penalized by not being credible enough to start a new lobbying process, given that the 
decision-maker has no incentive to believe him when the second interaction takes place.  
In this case, it is safer for the decision-maker to maintain the status quo regardless of 
the messages received. This means that when E lies it loses reputation and its credibility 
becomes too low to start a second game and to persuade the decision-maker into changing 
the status quo. 
Now, we shall consider the situation in which interest groups act after the decision-
maker reveals its utility function: the groups involved observe how the decision-maker 
rank its preferences and then decide the lobbying messages they will send. We define this 
scenario as reactive lobbying. 
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Consider that the decision-maker is determined to leave the status quo by 
implementing a new public policy that affects the welfare of the two interest groups 
involved in the process. This decision refers to the beliefs of the decision-maker regarding 
the preferences of its voters. However, depending on the lobbying messages received, the 
decision-maker may be willing to reevaluate its position. 
 Again, we say that one of the groups is F while the other is E and that, after 
discovering that the decision-maker is willing to implement a new policy, they send 
lobbying messages to support the proposed policy or to try to persuade the decision-maker 
into implementing another policy. Suppose, for example, that lobbying messages are 
private information related to the possible outputs generated by implementing the 
proposed policy, and that, by considering its outputs, the decision-maker may be willing 
to reevaluate its position. Similar to the proactive lobbying, we say the decision-maker 
only discovers if the groups lied and whether they are an “enemy” or a “friend” after 
making the decision regarding the messages received. 
In this scenario, we assume that in the absence of a lobbying message, the decision-
maker implements its preferred public policy. Under this situation, we assume that both 
interest groups get an increase in their utility. F will be in a better situation than E given 
that F’s utility functions are similar to the decision-maker’s. E’s welfare improves, but 
not as much as it would if the decision-maker had implemented E’s preferred public 
policy. This is also true if the groups decide to send different messages: imagine that one 
group has decided to support the decision-maker’s position while the other has decided 
to persuade the decision-maker into implementing another policy. Under this situation, it 
is expected that the decision-maker will act based on its prior beliefs guaranteeing 
political support from its voters and from the interest group that supported its decision. 
Logically, if both interest groups decide to send the same lobbying messages, we expect 
the decision-maker to believe that the information is an accurate report.  
We model the reactive lobbying as a simultaneous-move game. After the decision-
maker reveals its utility functions, we say that both groups will transmit their lobbying 
messages simultaneously because none of them had the proactive behavior of starting the 
process. The groups are merely reacting to the decision-maker’s demands by answering 
to a request. 
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It is expected that F has no incentive to try to misinform the decision-maker, given 
that their interests are aligned. This is not true for E. 
Assuming the existence of a second interaction between the interest groups and the 
decision-maker, its decision rule only remains unchanged if at least one of the groups 
chose to report truthful information on the first-stage. If one of the groups lied on the first 
stage of the game, it is expected that it will lose reputation. However, considering that the 
decision-maker is sure about which policy it prefers to implement, it is more concerned 
in securing some support from either of the groups regarding its position than in assuring 
support by both of them regarding another possible policy, especially if one of the groups 
has proved to be a liar. For this reason, even if F lies and the decision-maker discovers 
that this led the group to a worst situation, the decision-maker will consider the signal 
received if it supports its prior beliefs on the second stage of the game. The same is true 
for E, even if the lie placed it in a better situation. Finally, if we assume that both interest 
groups lie on the first stage, when the second stage of the game takes place, the decision-
maker believes nothing they say and prefers to follow its prior beliefs by implementing 
its preferred policy – this happens because the lie of both groups at the first-stage of the 
game led the decision-maker to take a wrong decision. 
The incorporation of the benefits and the losses associated to telling the truth or a lie 
in the model should also consider another relevant aspect: under the situations in which 
E has incentives to lie and chooses not to, E gets reputation that allows it to ensure 
incremental gains on the second stage of the game. This assumption derives from 
Peltzman’s (1976) idea that decision-makers select the benefits structure that guarantee 
political support from all groups3. For example, imagine a debate about the 
implementation of a new policy that requires a high level of bureaucratic control by its 
executors, which we assume to be E and F. We say that F is favorable to the 
implementation of the proposed policy while E is contrary to it. When E informs the 
decision-maker about the possible outcomes of the policy, it can signal truthful 
information and, even if the policy is, in fact, implemented, E might get as a reward a 
reduction of the bureaucratic level initially proposed by the decision-maker, which would 
be contrary to F’s interests. This situation would lead to incremental improvement of E’s 
 
3 See Section 2. 
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payoff. Logically, E would only be able to demand such incremental payoff if it is credible 
enough to influence the decision-maker. We assume that an increase in E’s payoff leads 
to a decrease in F’s payoff – not necessarily in the same proportion – and that reputation 
gains could also be reflected by the increment associated with small adjustments to the 
policy initially proposed by the decision-maker. 
Under the situations in which E lies in the first stage of the game, it makes no sense 
to discuss incremental gains associated with the increase of the influence power over the 
government, considering that there are no reputation gains. In the same direction, for F, 
incremental gains make no sense due to its alignment with the government and its total 
disincentive to lie. Thus, the exposed understanding for the construction of the payoffs 
must be reflected in the situations in which E tells the truth expecting to be rewarded at 
the second stage of the game. This situation is, indeed, observed in many real situations. 
A policymaker may wish to impose a tax only in one group, for example, E. If both 
groups, E and F, have a good reputation and provide truthful information, the government 
may choose to implement the tax but to reduce the rate proposed initially. 
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4. THE BASIC MODEL 
Considering the complexity that characterizes the political and regulatory 
environment, the lobbying model presented here is an attempt to incorporate all relevant 
aspects regarding strategic informational lobbying in a synthetic structure.  
We model lobbying as a two-player, two-stage game. The players are two groups with 
conflicting interests who compete for influence, denoted by E and F. In each stage, the 
two groups aim at impelling a benevolent decision-maker, the government, to take action 
and implement one of two possible policies. Policies in the first stage of the game are 
denoted by X1 = {x1, x2} and policies in the second stage of the game are denoted by X
2 
= {x3, x4}. If no policy is taken, the status quo (SQ) remains. The interest groups’ payoffs 
reflect the policies chosen in both stages of the game. 
The real impact of each policy is unknown to the government but known to the interest 
groups. We assume that policies x1 and x3 are welfare superior when compared to policies 
x2 and x4, respectively. Moreover, policy x1 is preferred by group F and policy x2 is 
preferred by group E in the first stage of the game; in the second stage, policy x3 is 
preferred by group F and policy x4 is preferred by group E
4. 
The groups exercise influence by sending messages to the government. For simplicity, 
there are two possible messages available in the first stage of the game – message θ1 aims 
at convincing the government to implement policy x1, while message θ2 favors policy x2; 
likewise, there are two messages available in the second stage of the game – θ3 supports 
policy x3, while θ4 favors policy x4. Given the welfare effects of each policy, messages θ1 
and θ3 are truthful, while messages θ2 and θ4 are biased. 
Once messages are sent, the government processes the messages received and makes 
a decision by choosing one of the policies and thus setting the outcome for that stage. We 
assume that the government is primarily, but not necessarily, reelection seeker (Mayhew, 
1974; Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992). As such, in the first stage of the game, in pursuing 
reelection, the government chooses the policy that carries support in case messages are 
identical. 
 
4 Therefore, F’s interests are aligned with those of the benevolent government, while E’s are not. This 
justifies notation: F stands for “friend” and E stands for “enemy”. 
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Once a policy is chosen at the end of the first stage, the government observes its real 
impact. The second stage of the game starts with the two interest groups sending messages 
θ3 or θ4 to the government, which triggers the government’s reaction to set the outcome 
for the second stage. This time, the government’s decision reflects reelection concerns 
but also penalizes the interest group that conveyed a biased message in the first stage, in 
case such a group exists. 
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5. PROACTIVE LOBBYING 
5.1. The Sequential Game 
Our first scenario is proactive lobbying. In each stage of the game, the two interest 
groups, E and F, play a perfect information, sequential game, where E moves first and is 
followed by F. In what the government is concerned, it discovers if the senders sent a 
truthful or a biased message in the first stage, at the end of this stage. Such knowledge 
conditions the government’s decision in the second stage of the game, so that the interest 
groups – E in particular – may provide accurate and unbiased information in the first stage 
in order to take advantage of their reputation later5. 
As described in the previous section, the two interest groups have conflicting 
preferences over possible policies and the status quo (SQ). This is reflected in the 
following assumptions, where Ui(p), p = x1, x2, x3, x4, SQ and i = E, F denote the utility 
that interest group i derives from p. 
Assumption A1. UF(x1) > UF(SQ) > UF(x2) and UF(x3) > UF(SQ) > UF(x4). 
Assumption A2. UE(x2) > UE(x1) > UE(SQ) and UE(x4) > UE(x3) > UE(SQ). 
Interest group i’s payoff, i = E, F, is the sum of utilities obtained in the first and in the 
second stages of the game. Moreover, we assume that F’s payoff when the government 
chooses not to take action is greater than that of E: 
Assumption A3. UF(SQ) > UE(SQ).  
Assumption A3 justifies the fact that E plays first in the sequential game, considering 
that it is less satisfied with the SQ than F and that every action taken by the government 
is better than the SQ. Following E, group F will play to reinforce or counteract the 
message sent by E. 
 
5 See Hayes (1981). Having access is more important than winning. If a group forfeits access, it loses 
the benefit of being consulted and the opportunities of influence that go with it. 
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FIGURE 1. Sequence of decisions in the first stage of the proactive lobbying game 
 
As mentioned in Section 4, we assume that groups know the true impact of each 
policy. Namely, policy x1 is welfare superior to policy x2 and policy x3 is superior to x4. 
Since the government is not aware of policies’ welfare effects, the interest groups send 
messages that support one of the two possible policies in order to influence the 
government to take action. If a group chooses message θ = θ1 (θ = θ3), which favors the 
welfare superior policy x1 (x3), it is telling the truth; whereas if a group chooses θ = θ2 (θ 
= θ4), it is providing biased information to the government. For example, E may want to 
persuade the government into changing the SQ in order to improve its welfare by 
informing the government about the possible positive outcome of new regulations; being 
aware that F is also able to signal the true impact of such regulations, E decides whether 
to inform (tell the truth, say θ = θ1 or θ = θ3) or to misinform (lie, say θ = θ2 or θ = θ4) the 
government. Following E, group F plays and, after observing all the messages, the 
government decides to implement or not one of the new regulations. In the first stage of 
the game, strategic play additionally implies anticipating possible reputation effects from 
providing biased information. 
In what concerns F, it has no incentive to try to mislead the government, given that 
both have similar preferences. For that reason, in case F chooses to lie, the government 
can only conclude that F was uninformed or committed a mistake. 
Given the concepts presented in Section 3 regarding the utilities of the decision-
maker, the following table lists all plausible actions taken by the interest groups and the 
government’s decision for each combination of actions. 
E sends lobbying 
message to leave 
the SQ









discovers if the 
groups lied or 
told the truth
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TABLE 1. Message profiles and corresponding outcomes for the proactive lobbying 
 
5.2. Equilibrium 
We use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium to solve the lobbying game. A 
subgame perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the game (i.e., a pair of strategies 
or plans of action of E and F that are best replies to each other) that induces a Nash 
equilibrium in every subgame of the original game. Since the game we describe is a 
perfect information game, subgame perfect equilibria can be obtained by backwards 
induction. 
In the description of the subgame perfect equilibrium of this two-stage game, we 
assume that the game has payoffs as defined in Table 26. 
 








both tell the truth θ3, θ3 x3
E tells the truth, F lies θ3, θ4 SQ
E lies, F tells the truth θ4, θ3 SQ
both lie θ4, θ4 x4
both tell the truth θ3, θ3 x3
E tells the truth, F lies θ3, θ4 SQ
E lies, F tells the truth θ4, θ3 SQ
both lie θ4, θ4 x4
both tell the truth θ3, θ3 SQ
E tells the truth, F lies θ3, θ4 SQ
E lies, F tells the truth θ4, θ3 SQ
both lie θ4, θ4 SQ
both tell the truth θ3, θ3 SQ
E tells the truth, F lies θ3, θ4 SQ
E lies, F tells the truth θ4, θ3 SQ
both lie θ4, θ4 SQ
x2
θ1, θ1both tell the truth
E tells the truth, F 
lies
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TABLE 2. Payoffs of the Two-Stage Sequential Game 
 
Firstly, consider E’s decision: E must decide whether to lie or not to the government 
in order to improve its utility. When there is more than one stage, E may supply useful 
information to the government at first to take advantage of its reputation later (Sobel; 
1985). This means that E is aware that if the government discovers a lie in the first stage 
when the second stage takes place, it will not believe in anything E says. In other words, 
lying in the first stage leads E to lose reputation, which is reflected in the second stage of 
the game and, hence, on its payoff. Additionally, when deciding whether to lie or not, E 
is aware of F’s payoffs. 
Considering the decision rules established for the proactive game, for the first 
interaction, even though E prefers to induce the government into implementing policy x2 
by saying that θ = θ2, if F chooses to signal that θ = θ1, E prefers to tell the truth and 
guarantee some payoff. Therefore, if F tells the truth, E prefers to tell the truth. However, 
if F lies, E prefers to lie. Under this scenario, the only way E has to assure a payoff 
different from zero when it decides to lie on the first stage of the game is to make sure 
that F’s message will also be a lie. 
Message (E, F, E, F); 
Outcomes
Expected Senders' payoff 
(E; F)
θ1, θ1, θ3, θ3; x1, x3 a1; b1
θ1, θ1, θ3, θ4; x3, SQ a2; b2
θ1, θ1, θ4, θ3; x3, SQ a2; b2
θ1, θ1, θ4, θ4; x3, x4 a3; b3
θ1, θ2, θ3, θ3; SQ, x3 a4; b4
θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4; SQ, SQ 0; 0
θ1, θ2, θ4, θ3; SQ, SQ 0; 0
θ1, θ2, θ4, θ4; SQ, x4 a5; b5
θ2, θ1, θ3, θ3; SQ, SQ 0; 0
θ2, θ1, θ3, θ4; SQ, SQ 0; 0
θ2, θ1, θ4, θ3; SQ, SQ 0; 0
θ2, θ1, θ4, θ4; SQ, SQ 0; 0
θ2, θ2, θ3, θ3; x2, SQ a6; b6
θ2, θ2, θ3, θ4; x2, SQ a6; b6
θ2, θ2, θ4, θ3; x2, SQ a6; b6
θ2, θ2, θ4, θ4; x2, SQ a6; b6
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Now, consider F’s decision: F must decide whether to reinforce or to counteract E’s 
message. It is logical that F has incentives to always tell the truth in both stages of the 
game and E is aware of this fact. Again, when deciding whether to lie or not, F is informed 
about E’s payoffs. 
Before describing the equilibrium of the game, we shall state some relations between 
the expected payoffs. 
If both E and F lie on the first stage of the game, the government implements policy 
x2, which guarantees an increase in utility for E despite leaving F in a worse situation than 
it would be if the SQ were maintained. As discussed previously, once the government 
discovers that E lied, the second interaction will guarantee a null payoff for both groups, 
considering that E’s message will not be credible enough to persuade the government to 
change the SQ. Under this scenario, the sum of the single-period payoff for both players 
is assumed to be a6 for E while it is assumed to be b6 for F. Logically, b6 < 0, what 
confirms that the implementation of policy x2 is a worse scenario for F than maintaining 
the SQ. 
The situation in which E lies and F tells the truth on the first stage of the game leads 
the government to take no action (SQ) in both stages of the game. Under this scenario, 
the total payoff for both players would be zero. 
If we consider that E decides to tell the truth and F to lie in the first stage, the 
government will take no action (SQ), in accordance with the previous scenario. However, 
considering that E chose not to lie, it earns reputation that assures the government will 
listen to its lobbying message when the second interaction takes place. Given that, if E 
and F choose the same message in the second interaction, the government will believe it. 
Logically, for E, the best situation would be if both groups decided to lie. If this is the 
case, we assume that E gets a payoff of a5 while F gets b5. However, we are aware that 
this would be a bad scenario for F. Hence, we expect that F tells the truth. We assume 
that if E and F tell the truth when the second interaction takes place, E gets a payoff of a4 
while F gets b4. Evidently, a5 > a4 > 0 and b4 > 0 > b5. In fact, b5 is the worst possible 
payoff for F since it represents a decrease in its utility associated with the fact that E 
assures reputation to persuade the government into starting a second interaction. This 
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means that 0 > b6 > b5. In the opposite direction, if the groups send different messages, 
the SQ will be maintained for the second stage, guaranteeing a total null payoff for each 
player. 
Finally, we shall analyze the situation when both E and F tell the truth in the first stage 
of the game and the government implements policy x1, which yields utility for both 
groups. The utility F gets is higher than the utility granted for E. When the second 
interaction takes place, the government will believe in both signals and the SQ will be 
maintained only if the groups decide to send different messages. Under this situation, we 
assume that the sum of E’s single-period payoff would be a2 while F’s would be b2. Those 
values derive from the first stage of the game, considering that keeping the SQ for the 
second stage yields a null payoff for both players. On the other hand, in the case where 
the messages sent are equal, the government will implement policy x3 if the messages are 
that θ = θ3, which is the best scenario for F (policy x1 implemented on the first stage and 
policy x3 implemented on the second stage). We assume that this situation ensures a total 
payoff of b1, F’s highest possible payoff. For E, we assume that the payoff would be a1. 
Since we assumed previously that policies x1 and x3 ensure some payoff for E, we can 
state that a1 > a2 > 0. Considering that both groups decide to lie in the second stage and 
the government implements policy x4, E would get a3 as total payoff and F would get b3. 
In order to attend all the assumptions established so far, it is expected that a3 > a1 > a2 and 
that b1 > b2 > b3. 
In order to establish the equilibrium, we must state additional comparison relations 
between the expected payoffs for E. We assume that a3 > a6 > 0 to illustrate that if E and 
F tell the truth on the first stage and then lie on the second stage, E will get a better payoff 
than it would if both of then lied on the first stage. More specifically, telling the truth 
enables E to start a new game in which the implementation of policy x4 is a better scenario 
than the implementation of policy x3; lying leads to the SQ in the second stage, which 
implies no increase of utility. For the same reason, we assume that a5 > a6. Finally, it is 
intuitive to assume that a1 > a4 > 0 since a1 is associated with positive payoffs for the 
implementation of policy x1 in the first stage and of policy x3 in the second stage, while 
a4 is associated with a positive payoff only for the implementation of action x3 in the 
second stage. 
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Finally, given the relations between the expected payoffs, we obtain equilibria by 
using backwards induction. The extensive form of the proactive game is illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
FIGURE 2. Tree of the sequential game 
 
We begin the analysis by examining the final decision nodes of F, who has to choose 
whether or not to lie to the government in the second stage. At this point, F knows the 
whole story of the game. One way to narrow its choices is to observe what E chose in the 
first decision node (in the first stage of the game): if E tells the truth, F always tells the 
truth on the second stage (b1 > b2 > b3 and b4 > 0 > b5), and, if E lies, F is indifferent 
between lying or telling the truth in the second stage of the game. 
Now, move backward up the game tree to E’s decision nodes in the second stage of 
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that E is aware of F’s incentives to tell the truth. If E tells the truth in the first stage, it 
always chooses to tell the truth in the second stage of the game (a1 > a2 and a4 > 0). On 
the other hand, if E lies, it is indifferent between lying or telling the truth in the second 
stage of the game. 
Again, moving backwards to the first set of decision nodes of F, we can see that this 
group always chooses to tell the truth independently of what E does in its first decision 
node (b1 > b4 and 0 > b6). 
Finally, by analyzing the first decision node, we conclude that E chooses to tell the 
truth (a1 > 0). 
In conclusion, the subgame perfect equilibrium consists of both players telling the 
truth in order to induce government into implementing policy x1 in the first stage and x3 
in the second stage of the game, which yields a payoff of a1 for E and b1 for F. This result 
yields a better payoff for both groups than remaining in the SQ.
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6. REACTIVE LOBBYING 
6.1. The Simultaneous-move Game 
Our second scenario is reactive lobbying. In each stage of the game, the two interest 
groups E and F play imperfect information, simultaneous-move game. All aspects 
assumed for the construction of the sequential game apply to the simultaneous-move 
game. When this generalization fails, we will indicate it. 
As described in Section 4, the two interest groups have conflicting preferences over 
two possible policies. This is reflected in the following assumptions, where Ui(p), p = x1, 
x2, x3, x4 and i = E, F denotes the utility that interest group i derives from p. In the reactive, 
the status quo is not a possibility given that the government necessarily implements a new 
public policy. 
Assumption A1’. UE(x2) > UE(x1) and UE(x4) > UE(x3) > 0.  
Assumption A2’. UF(x1) > UF(x2) and UF(x3) > UF(x4) > 0. 
Additionally: 
Assumption A3’. UF(x1) > UE(x1) and UF(x3) > UE(x3). 
Assumption A4’. UF(x2) < UE(x2) and UF(x4) < UE(x4). 
Assumptions A3’ and A4’ reflect the fact that the implementation of policy x1 (x3) 
yields more utility for F than for E. In the opposite direction, the implementation of policy 
x2 (x4) yields more utility for E than for F. 
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As mentioned in Section 4, we assume that groups know the true impact of each 
policy. Namely, policy x1 is welfare superior to policy x2 and policy x3 is superior to x4. 
Since the government is not aware of policies’ welfare effects, the interest groups send 
messages that support one of the two possible policies in order to influence the 
government’s action. 
Given the concepts presented in Section 3 regarding the utilities of the government 
and the model presented in Sections 4 and 5, the following table lists all plausible actions 
taken by the interest groups and the government’s decision for each combination of 
actions. 









both tell the truth θ3, θ3 x3
E tells the truth, F lies θ3, θ4 x3
E lies, F tells the truth θ4, θ3 x3
both lie θ4, θ4 x4
both tell the truth θ3, θ3 x3
E tells the truth, F lies θ3, θ4 x3
E lies, F tells the truth θ4, θ3 x3
both lie θ4, θ4 x4
both tell the truth θ3, θ3 x3
E tells the truth, F lies θ3, θ4 x3
E lies, F tells the truth θ4, θ3 x3
both lie θ4, θ4 x4
both tell the truth θ3, θ3 x3
E tells the truth, F lies θ3, θ4 x3
E lies, F tells the truth θ4, θ3 x3
both lie θ4, θ4 x3
E tells the truth, F 
lies
θ1, θ2 x1
Stage 1 Stage 2
both tell the truth θ1, θ1 x1
E lies, F tells the 
truth
θ2, θ1 x1
both lie θ2, θ2 x2
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For the analysis of this two-stage game, we assume that the game has the payoffs as 
described in Table 47. 
TABLE 4. Payoffs of the Two-Stage Simultaneous Game 
 
For the proactive model, we assumed that F could have negative payoffs. However, 
for the reactive model, this does not occur since both policies x1 and x2 (x3 and x4) lead 
to improvements in F’s and E’s utilities – unlike the proactive game, the reactive game 
has positive payoffs associated to the situations in which the groups send different 
lobbying messages. 
Firstly, we consider E’s decision: similar to the proactive game, E has to choose 
whether to lie or not to the government, aware that this choice impacts its reputation for 
the second stage of the game. However, under this scenario, E is aware of which policy 
the government is inclined to implement. Regarding F’s decision, it is logical to suppose 
 
7 Figure 4 below contains the tree of the simultaneous-move game. 
Message (E, F, E, F); 
Outcomes
Expected Senders' payoff 
(E; F)
θ1, θ1, θ3, θ3; x1, x3 c1; d1
θ1, θ1, θ3, θ4; x1, x3 c2; d2
θ1, θ1, θ4, θ3; x1, x3 c3; d3
θ1, θ1, θ4, θ4; x1, x4 c4; d4
θ1, θ2, θ3, θ3; x1, x3 c5; d5
θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4; x1, x3 c6; d6
θ1, θ2, θ4, θ3; x1, x3 c7; d7
θ1, θ2, θ4, θ4; x1, x4 c8; d8
θ2, θ1, θ3, θ3; x1, x3 c9; d9
θ2, θ1, θ3, θ4; x1, x3 c9; d9
θ2, θ1, θ4, θ3; x1, x3 c9; d9
θ2, θ1, θ4, θ4; x1, x4 c10; d10
θ2, θ2, θ3, θ3; x2, x3 c11; d11
θ2, θ2, θ3, θ4; x2, x3 c11; d11
θ2, θ2, θ4, θ3; x2, x3 c11; d11
θ2, θ2, θ4, θ4; x2, x3 c11; d11
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that, knowing its preferences are similar to the government’s, F has no incentive to 
misinform it. 
Now we shall describe and analyze the relations between the payoffs associated with 
each action taken by E and by F in order to define the equilibrium of the game. 
If both E and F lie on the first stage of the game, government implements policy x2, 
which guarantees an increase in utility for E and F. In this case, E will gain a better payoff 
than F. As discussed previously, once the government discovers that both groups lied, it 
will act in accordance to its prior beliefs when the second stage of the game takes place. 
Even so, after the first stage is played, the government discovers that F has similar 
preferences. As such, even if the government doubts F due to the previous lie, a policy 
implemented in accordance with the government’s prior beliefs improves F’s payoff. 
Under this scenario, the sum of payoffs for the two periods is assumed to be c11 for E and 
d11 for F. 
The situation in which E lies and F tells the truth in the first stage of the game leads 
the government to implement policy x1. For the second stage of the game, the government 
implements action x4 only if both groups decide to lie. In this case, the sum of payoffs for 
the two periods is assumed to be c10 for E and d10 for F. In every other situation, the 
government implements policy x3. So, E gets a payoff of c9 while F gets d9. It is logical 
to note that it is expected that c10 > c9, given that c10 is associated with the implementation 
of policy x4, which is the policy preferred by E. This implies that d9 > d10. We also expect 
that c11 > c9 and that d9 > d11 since c11 and d11 are related to the implementation of policy 
x2 in the first stage of the game, while c9 and d9 are related to the implementation of x1. 
For the same reason, d10 > d11. 
If we consider that E decides to tell the truth and F to lie in the first stage, the 
government implements policy x1. In accordance with the previous scenario, for the 
second stage of the game, the government implements policy x4 only if both players 
decide to lie. In this case, the sum of payoffs for the two periods is assumed to be c8 for 
E and d8 for F. In all other situations, the government implements x3. We assume that if 
E and F tell the truth when the second interaction takes place, E gets a payoff of c5, while 
F gets d5; if E tells the truth and F lies in the second stage, E gets a payoff of c6, while F 
VANESSA S. MELLO  COMPETITIVE LOBBYING: THE MATTER OF NON-
EGOISTIC BEHAVIOR IN REPEATED GAMES 
36 
 
gets d6; and, if E lies and F tells the truth in the second stage, E gets a payoff of c7, while 
F gets d7. Evidently, c8 > c7 and d7 > d8, indicating that the implementation of x4 in the 
second stage is preferred by E but not by F. In order to be consistent with all the 
assumptions and the rules defined for the construction of the payoffs, it is also expected 
that c6 ≥ c5, since a lie of F in the second stage could ensure an incremental gain for E. In 
the opposite direction, we expect that d5 > d6, reinforcing that F has no incentive to lie. It 
is also relevant to verify that c7 > c5 since c7 is related to possible incremental gains E 
may get by using its reputation in order to misinform the govern in the second stage. We 
let c7 ≥ c6 for the same reason, the difference between both payoffs is that when E uses it 
reputation to lie in the second stage it can guide the government’s decision more easily 
than when it is F who lies. Contrary to relations defined for E’s payoffs, we expect that 
d5 > d7 and d6 ≥ d7. 
Finally, we shall analyze the situation in which both E and F tell the truth in the first 
stage of the game. Again, the government implements x4 in the second stage only if both 
players decide to lie. Here, we assume that the sum of payoffs for the two periods of the 
game is c4 for E and d4 for F. We assume that if E and F tell the truth when the second 
interaction takes place, E gets a payoff of c1, while F gets d1. It is evident that d1 is the 
best expect payoff for F given that it refers to the case in which both players tell the truth 
in the two stages and policies x1 and x4 are implemented. In addition, it is expected that 
c5 ≥ c1 given that c5 is associated with a lie of F in the first stage, which gives E an 
advantage in influencing the decision-maker. Now, considering that E tells the truth and 
F lies in the second stage, E gets a payoff of c2, while F gets d2; and, if E lies and F tells 
the truth in the second stage, E gets a payoff of c3, while F gets d3. Given the explanation 
in the previous paragraph regarding the incremental gains, it is easy to note that c4 > c3 ≥ 
c2 > c1 and that d1 > d2 ≥ d3 > d4. 
In order to determine the equilibrium, we must state additional comparison relations 
between the expected payoffs for the players. Regarding F, we expect d3 > d7 given that 
both payoffs are related to the implementation of policy x1 in the first stage of the game, 
but d3 refers to a situation in which F lies and loses reputation. Regarding E, it is clear 
that c8 is the best possible payoff the player could get: policy x1 is implemented in the 
first stage and E gains reputation that allows him to influence the government into 
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implementing policy x4 in the second stage of the game. Its second-best payoff is c11, 
related to the implementation of policy x2 in the first stage at the expense of its reputation 
and the implementation of policy x3 in the second stage of the game. Finally, we expect 
that c3 > c9. Even though both payoffs refer to the implementation of policies x1 and x3, 
c9 is related to a lie of E in the first stage, which leads the group to lose reputation for the 
second stage. 
Given the relations between the expected payoffs, we determine the equilibria 
associated with this game using backwards induction. The extensive form of the reactive 
game is illustrated in Figure 4. 
FIGURE 4. Tree of the simultaneous game 
 
We begin the analysis by examining the final decision nodes of F, who has to choose 
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its decision. One way to narrow its choices is to observe what E chose in the first decision 
node. If E tells the truth in the first stage of the game, F always tells the truth in the second 
stage (d1 > d2 and d3 > d4 and d5 > d6 and d7 > d8). However, if E lies in the first stage, F 
makes different choices at different decision nodes. For this reason, we must move 
forward and observe F’s action in the second level of decision nodes: if it reports a lie, F 
is indifferent between lying or telling the truth in the last decision nodes of the game; if 
it reports the truth, F chooses to tell the truth in its last decision node if E decides to lie 
again (d9 > d10) and F is indifferent between lying or telling the truth if E chooses to tell 
the truth in the third level of decision nodes of the game. 
Now, move backwards to E’s decision node in the second stage of the game. Again, 
we must observe E’s choice in the first decision node and have in mind that E is aware of 
F’s payoffs. If E tells the truth in the first stage, it always chooses to lie in the second 
stage of the game (c3 > c1 and c7 > c5). On the other hand, if E lies, it makes different 
choices in different decision nodes. So, we must move forward and observe F’s action in 
the second decision node: if it reports a lie, E is indifferent between lying or telling the 
truth in the third decision node of the game; if it reports the truth, E chooses to lie (c10 > 
c9). 
Again, moving backwards to the first decision node of F we can see that the group 
always chooses to tell the truth independently of what E does in its first decision node (d3 
> d7 and d10 > d11). 
Finally, by analyzing the first decision node, we conclude that E will choose to tell 
the truth (c3 > c9). 
Given that the players maximize the sum of payoffs obtained in the two periods, we 
conclude that the equilibrium consists of F telling the truth in both stages of the game and 
E telling the truth in the first stage, but lying in the second stage of the game. This yields 
a payoff of c3 for E and d3 for F.
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This research is concerned with the extent that private interest groups can consider 
the preferences of other agents when lobbying. In the real world, there are many interest 
groups, decision-makers, and sources of uncertainty. The model presented here is 
parsimonious in the extreme in these respects. For this reason, the results must be 
interpreted cautiously. Nevertheless, they are suggestive: interest groups do lobby 
decision-makers with similar utility functions; lobbying messages may be informative 
even if there is a partial conflict of interest; and, groups do invest in reputation when 
interacting with the decision-maker. 
From the analysis, it appears that several aspects are crucial for persuading the 
decision-maker into changing its beliefs: (a) the credibility of the group that sends a 
lobbying message; (b) the decision-maker’s willingness to change its prior beliefs; and, 
(c) the impact on other electors.  
We have seen that the implementation of one policy rather than another cannot be 
explained solely in terms of group forces. This research points into the direction that 
groups are not merely service providers for decision-makers: groups do attempt to change 
decision-makers’ beliefs in their favor and they do compete with one another for 
influence. 
In this sense, we build two scenarios for the game-theoretical lobbying model. For the 
proactive scenario, we conclude that both groups have no incentive to misinform the 
decision-maker. For the reactive scenario, we conclude that the group with partial conflict 
of interests with the decision-maker has incentives to build a reputation by providing 
accurate information in order to take advantages in the future. However, in both scenarios, 
the group we call “enemy” is aware that the decision-maker interacts with another agent, 
the “friend”: the decision-maker receives different lobbying messages, which may be 
contradictory, and this situation is an incentive for both groups not to present biased 
information (one group may end up denying information from another group). 
Additionally, given that the decision-maker wants to assure political support, the “enemy” 
group concludes its chance of success is higher when it considers the preferences of its 
rival group, “friend”, when sending a lobbying message. For this reason, we can state that 
private interest groups may consider the preferences of other agents, even if it is with the 
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purpose of improving its own utility. This conclusion is similar to Peltzman’s (1976) – 
communicating good information and defending a claim with other agents leads to an 
increased chance of success. 
In the model presented we have assumed that both interest groups assume the position 
of “enemy” or “friend” statically. However, in real world situations, an interest groups 
might be a “friend” of the decision-maker for one specific issue and an “enemy” for 
another. This situation makes it more difficult for the decision-maker to decide whether 
to trust or not its interlocutor. For the purpose of this research we have disregarded the 
cost of sending lobbying messages and the possibility of interest groups not to send 
lobbying messages. Additionally, when analyzing lobbying in regulated sectors, we 
should consider that regulators are independent of the government and, therefore, they 
are not reelection seekers.  
Considering that the relationship between lobbyists and decision-makers is not one 
way, it would be interesting to understand the role of the decision-maker into influencing 
interest groups to always report truthful information. Additionally, an interesting exercise 
would be to model the behavior of rival interest groups competing with unorganized 
voters. All this is left for future work.
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